Brown University Shooting After-Action Reviews: Lessons for K-12 Schools

Brown University presents different security challenges than those facing most K-12 schools. However, many of the issues identified and lessons learned following the Dec. 13, 2025, mass shooting can also be applied to K-12 schools.

The shooting inside Brown’s Barus & Holley building killed two students and injured nine others. The gunman left the building and remained at large for five days. Brown commissioned Teneo Risk to review the university’s actions before, during, and after the shooting, while the City of Providence separately hired the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) to assess the municipal response.

Both reviews praised significant parts of the response while also identifying areas where preparedness and coordination could be strengthened. The findings involving emergency communications, interagency coordination, camera access, mutual aid, staffing, and reunification raise many of the same questions K-12 school safety teams face when developing and testing their own emergency plans.

Emergency Alerts and Backup Personnel

Two Brown public safety dispatchers were on duty when they received the first reports of gunfire. Within minutes, they were dealing with more calls and radio traffic than they could handle. Teneo found the dispatchers prioritized the most urgent life-safety functions, but the volume prevented them from immediately sending a Rave emergency alert. They also lacked authority to issue the alert without supervisory approval.

Teneo said the delay did not result in additional harm because the shooter had already left campus. Brown is now working to clarify who can send emergency alerts and training additional staff outside of dispatch to send them. The university also established a crisis hotline in the summer of 2026 to provide information to families and help reduce the number of calls coming into dispatch during an emergency.

For K-12 districts, this raises questions about who is authorized to send an emergency alert if the person who typically handles that responsibility is unavailable or overwhelmed. Districts may also want to identify and train backup personnel who can access and activate their emergency notification systems.

Radio Interoperability

The Brown shooting also exposed the difference between having interoperable technology and knowing how to use it during an actual emergency. Teneo found that some Brown public safety officers were unfamiliar with how to use their portable radios to communicate directly with Providence police.

Providence police officers and Brown officers entered Barus & Holley from different locations without initially knowing the other agency was already inside, according to PERF. Their communications became integrated only after the officers physically encountered one another. PERF said this created an inherent risk because armed officers from two agencies were operating inside the same building without knowing the other group was there.

PERF recommended formalizing interoperable communications protocols, including clear expectations for channel use, coordination procedures and agency responsibilities, and reinforcing them through joint training and regional exercises.

Interagency Coordination

PERF found that the Providence response benefited from experienced personnel and strong professional relationships, but responders sometimes had to rely on those relationships and real-time adaptation to work through gaps in formalized notification, coordination, and shared protocols.

The report recommended establishing coordination procedures before an emergency and holding regular multi-agency exercises involving tactical, operational, and command-level personnel. Teneo identified a similar issue during the investigation, concluding Brown should have assigned a formal, full-time liaison to Providence police investigators from the earliest stages of the response until the shooter was located.

For K-12 districts, the findings also raise questions about agreements with local law enforcement. Those agreements can clarify who represents the district in unified command, who serves as a liaison to investigators, and how information, building access, and other resources will be provided during an emergency.

NCSSD members have also discussed how tabletop exercises can help identify gaps in emergency communications, law enforcement coordination and first-responder roles. Walking through those responsibilities can reveal when roles are unclear or when each organization assumes the other is responsible.

Video Access and Sharing

Surveillance footage became an important part of the search for the Brown shooter, but investigators initially faced delays identifying and accessing available video. One of the clearest examples involved a Brown shuttle bus. Providence detectives saw a shuttle on other video and asked whether the bus itself had cameras. Brown officials initially told investigators it did not, but detectives continued asking and ultimately learned the shuttle had a functioning camera system. The footage captured the shooter after he left Barus & Holley and helped investigators determine his direction of travel.

The finding also shows that relevant video may exist beyond a school’s security cameras, including on buses, at athletic facilities, in parking areas, or on third-party systems. Districts may want to consider who controls that footage and how it can be accessed during an emergency.

A recent NCSSD member discussion illustrates how complicated that can become. A district was considering a request from an outside organization that rents its athletic facilities and wanted to install and operate its own surveillance cameras. Situations like that raise questions about ownership, access, retention, and whether district officials could quickly obtain footage during an emergency or investigation.

Brown is also evaluating participation in Providence’s Real Time Crime Center, which would provide another mechanism for sharing information with law enforcement. SSL has reported on school districts developing policies governing law enforcement access to automated license plate reader data and other surveillance systems.

Mutual Aid Coordination

The Brown shooting drew a large response from local, state, and federal agencies. PERF found that the influx of personnel provided valuable resources but also created challenges with staging, tracking arriving officers, and assigning them to specific tasks. The problem was the absence of a pre-established structure for receiving and managing spontaneous mutual aid.

PERF recommended standardized protocols for staging, personnel accountability, and real-time resource assignments, reinforced through joint training and exercises.

Local police officers and firefighters may regularly train at a school and know its entrances, hallways, and terminology, while mutual-aid responders arriving from neighboring jurisdictions may never have been inside the building. That makes maps, clearly identified entrances, and other access information especially important during a large-scale response.

Emergency Responder Access

Brown’s review found some Providence police and fire personnel had difficulty accessing buildings within the secured perimeter. The problems resulted in forced entry and may have delayed responders attempting to reach students sheltering inside, although reviewers said they did not delay treatment of wounded victims. Mutual-aid personnel also encountered difficulties because they were unfamiliar with portions of the campus, including building locations and addresses.

Brown is now planning annual training for Providence police on its campus mapping application, addresses, building locations, and even common building nicknames that may not be familiar to outside responders.

The access issues identified at Brown also mirror challenges SSL recently examined around emergency responder access to secured school buildings. As schools add locks, gates and other access controls, districts also have to consider how police, fire, and EMS will get in during an emergency.

Staffing During a Major Emergency

The Brown shooting also demonstrated how quickly a major emergency expands beyond the immediate law enforcement response. Brown simultaneously had to communicate with students sheltering in place, support the investigation, organize reunification, respond to swatting calls directed at dispatch, cancel final exams, make family notifications, establish support services, account for unattended property, and respond to an attempted doxxing of a student.

Reviewers concluded Brown needed more robust emergency management staffing and capability, and Teneo found staffing levels within the university’s public safety operation limited its ability to respond, coordinate, and maintain operations during the incident.

For K-12 districts, the issue is whether enough people are prepared to handle multiple responsibilities at once. A major incident can quickly require family communications, law enforcement coordination, student accountability, reunification, and other tasks, while misinformation or additional threats can add to the workload.

Backup Reunification Sites

Brown’s reunification effort was one of the stronger parts of its response. Approximately 1,700 students were evacuated to two adjacent athletic facilities, and Teneo praised the way university personnel mobilized staff and resources to support them. However, Brown’s action plan noted that those locations may not always be available.

The university is now identifying alternate evacuation and reunification sites and working with Providence Emergency Management and outside organizations to establish the necessary plans and agreements.

K-12 districts may also want to identify backup reunification sites in case their primary location is unavailable or inaccessible. If those sites are owned by outside organizations, agreements may need to be established in advance.

Physical Security and Prevention

Brown’s reviews also examined security conditions at Barus & Holley before the shooting. The university’s public safety department was aware of previous trespassing and suspicious activity around the building. Teneo said those incidents showed areas where security could have been strengthened.

At the same time, reviewers cautioned against assuming stronger access control would have prevented the shooting. Teneo said additional patrols, stricter access controls or more extensive camera coverage might have created an opportunity to encounter the shooter before Dec. 13, but it’s unclear whether they would have. Reviewers also noted that if the shooter had been unable to enter Barus & Holley, he could have selected another location.

The same applies to K-12 schools. Locks, access control, cameras, and other security measures can address vulnerabilities, but they cannot guarantee an attack will be prevented.