11 Practitioner Takeaways from ALERRT's School-Based Active Shooter Report

Earlier this month, the Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) Center at Texas State University released a report examining the role of locked doors and access control in K–12 active shooter events.

Funded by the Security Industry Association (SIA), the report reviewed 54 K–12 school-based active shooter incidents involving 66 doors with which perpetrators interacted, and also looked at several averted or delayed incidents where locked doors or other physical security measures played a role. ALERRT noted that it retained full editorial independence over the study design, analysis, findings, and recommendations.

For me, this report is not simply about saying “locked doors matter,” although the data clearly supports that they do.

The deeper lesson is this: School safety systems must actually work under real conditions.

Here are my 11 biggest takeaways from the findings.

1. ALERRT report is really about “installed” versus “operational”

One of the biggest lessons is that having a lock, access-control system, written policy, or emergency plan does not automatically mean the protective function exists in real life.

The report found that among 47 doors with known status, 29 doors (61.7%) were unlocked or propped open at the time of the attack. It also found that among the 29 doors through which perpetrators successfully entered, 20 doors (69%) were unsecured.

That is a major operational finding.

The real question is not just: Do we have locks?

The better question is: Does the door close, latch, lock, stay secure, and perform the way people believe it will perform when seconds matter?

That is the kind of proof-of-life thinking we need to continue pushing in school safety.

2. Door maintenance should be treated as a life-safety function

This report also reinforces something that often gets overlooked: maintenance is not just a facilities issue.

A broken closer, misaligned latch, failed reader, missing strike, damaged frame, delayed work order, or lock that staff no longer trust can become a life-safety issue in the wrong moment.

The report highlights that routine noncompliance with locking policies, combined with unrepaired hardware defects, can render existing security infrastructure ineffective. It specifically recommends establishing a culture of compliance with door-security protocols, including maintenance tracking and regular audits.

Some of the most important school security work happens through inspections, work orders, maintenance tracking, and follow-up. If a door is intended to protect students and staff, then keeping that door functional should be treated as safety-critical work.

3. Threat-to-secure time may be one of the most important metrics

One of the deeper lessons is time: how quickly can a school recognize a threat and move to protective action?

The report’s Evergreen High School case study is important because staff initiated lockdown approximately 42 seconds after the first shot, and the attacker then spent nearly three minutes unsuccessfully attempting to re-enter the building before abandoning the effort. Across the broader dataset, 41 of 54 incidents (75.9%) involved some form of lockdown, but timing varied widely.

That is much deeper than “locks work.” The value of a locked door is connected to time. The faster a threat is recognized, communicated, and acted upon, the more likely physical security measures can influence the outcome.

That makes this both a hardware and operational issue involving communications, training, authority to act, and response procedures.

4. Locked doors must be connected to options-based response

This is an important point for me personally.

Locked doors create protective opportunity, but people still have to know how to use that opportunity.

The report found that 13 of the 41 lockdowns (31.7%) were initiated at or near the conclusion of the event, limiting how much those lockdowns could influence attacker access or victim exposure.

That should make all of us think carefully.

Lockdown cannot be treated as just a word in a plan. It has to be immediate, practiced, flexible, and connected to options-based protective action.

There are times to secure. There are times to move. There are times to evade. There are times to deny access. There are times to communicate, care, or take other protective actions based on the situation.

The message should not be “just lock the doors.” The better message is: Locked doors create protective opportunity. Options-based response helps people use that opportunity.

5. Common areas remain the hard problem

Locked classroom doors matter, but they do not solve every part of the school environment.

The report found that across the 54 incidents, 135 people were killed and 189 were wounded, for a total of 324 victims. Of those victims, 155 (47.8%) were shot inside classrooms. However, hallways accounted for 57 victims (17.6%); common areas such as open spaces, gyms, bathrooms, and foyers accounted for 46 victims (14.2%); outside areas accounted for 16 victims (4.9%); and cafeterias accounted for 14 victims (4.3%). The report further notes that hallways, common areas, cafeterias, and exterior spaces accounted for 133 victims (41%) — areas that are generally not easily secured once a perpetrator has gained access to the building.

That matters.

Hallways, common areas, arrival and dismissal zones, athletics, and other transition spaces are harder to secure once a threat is already inside or nearby.

My takeaway is that as schools strengthen classroom security, we should not assume the threat disappears. Risk may shift toward areas where students and staff are more exposed.

That does not reduce the importance of locked doors. It actually reinforces the need for a broader system.

Common areas require supervision, communications, rapid alerts, situational awareness, protective-action training, empowered decision-making, and practiced movement.

6. School attack start locations should shape our thinking

The report found that the most common attack start locations were hallways and areas outside the school building, each accounting for 13 of the 54 incidents (24.1%). Only seven attacks (13%) began in a classroom, and five (9.3%) began in a cafeteria.

The report also notes that in 14 incidents (25.9%), the perpetrator first went to a restroom or similar space to prepare before initiating the attack, with most of those cases occurring in high schools where the perpetrator was a current student with routine access to the building.

That is a significant planning issue.

It reminds us that school safety cannot only be built around the classroom. We must also think about movement, transition spaces, student gathering areas, restrooms, arrival/dismissal, lunch periods, athletic areas, and other locations where supervision and response become more complex.

7. Elementary and secondary schools need different priorities

The report reinforces that all schools should not be treated the same.

Current students accounted for 83.3% of high school perpetrators and 88.9% of middle school perpetrators, while none of the ten elementary school perpetrators were current students. The report also found that exterior doors were involved in 37.5% of elementary school door interactions, compared with 11.6% of high school door interactions.

That is a major policy point.

Elementary schools often have a different risk profile, especially when the threat may come from outside the school. That makes exterior access control, visitor management, entry control, glass, and perimeter integrity especially important.

Secondary schools also need strong exterior control, but because the threat may already be inside the building, they also need rapid interior lockdown capability, common-area response, student and staff empowerment, and options-based decision-making.

A one-size-fits-all mandate does not reflect how schools actually operate.

8. Glass is not a side issue — it is central to the opening

The report reinforces something every school safety assessment should account for: the lock is only one part of the opening.

Across the 54 events, the report documented nine mechanical breach attempts, of which six were successful. In every successful breach, the attacker defeated the barrier by shooting through glass. The report states that no locking mechanism in the dataset was mechanically defeated, and that flush doors with functional locks were never successfully breached.

The security question is not simply: Does the door lock?

The better question is: How does the entire opening perform?

That includes the door, frame, closer, latch, lock, strike, sidelight, vision light, glazing, access control, keying, maintenance, staff behavior, and emergency use.

A door-security discussion that ignores glass is incomplete.

9. Aftermarket access control devices deserve careful discussion

The report also raises issues around aftermarket devices, including barricade devices and magnetic strips.

This needs to be handled carefully and professionally, but the concern is real.

On barricade devices, the report notes concerns around whether they are necessary when code-compliant locks are properly installed and engaged, and it also discusses concerns related to egress, fire/life safety, ADA compliance, law enforcement access, emergency medical access, and potential attacker misuse.

On magnetic strips, the report explains that these devices can allow a door to appear closed while remaining functionally unlocked. It also notes that an attacker familiar with the device may be able to manipulate it for tactical advantage.

Convenience devices can create hidden failure modes. A school safety measure should not depend on concealment, special knowledge, extra steps, or the hope that everyone remembers to do the right thing under stress.

We have to keep fire/life safety, ADA, emergency responder access, egress, and attacker exploitation concerns in the same conversation as security. The goal should be functional, code-compliant, reliable security — not improvised fixes that create new risks.

10. Post-incident documentation needs to improve

Another important takeaway is that we still do not capture enough door and access-control information after incidents.

The report notes that one of the persistent challenges in the study was the absence of systematic documentation of door hardware in law enforcement investigative records. In many cases, details such as lock type, door construction, locking mechanism status, and whether a breach was attempted or successful were not recorded in official reports.

If we want better lessons, we need better documentation.

Post-incident reviews should capture door status, lock function, glass breach points, access-control performance, maintenance history, whether doors were propped, whether doors latched, and whether lockdown or other protective actions occurred before or after attacker movement.

This could be an area where NCSSD can help shape better practitioner-informed guidance.

11. This should not become “locks solve school shootings”

This may be the most important credibility point. The report should not be used to say locks alone solve school violence. They do not.

The report itself states that door locks and access-control measures are only one part of a comprehensive school safety program. It also notes that a substantial share of victims were located in common areas where doors are not a relevant barrier, and that physical security must be understood alongside broader prevention and response strategies.

Prevention, behavioral threat assessment, anonymous reporting, mental health supports, school climate, emergency planning, communications, training, public safety coordination, and recovery all still matter.

This is not a hardware-versus-prevention conversation. It is a systems conversation.

Bottom line

For me, the report reinforces what many practitioners have understood for a long time:

Doors matter.

Locks matter.

Access control matters.

Glass matters.

Maintenance matters.

Training matters.

Time matters.

Options-based response matters.

Common areas matter.

Above all, the report reinforces that HUMANS matter most. The human side cannot be separated from the hardware side. Hardware and technology only work if staff and students know what to do, have permission to act, and can communicate and move under stress.

For me, interoperability is not just systems talking to systems. It is people, procedures, technology, facilities, maintenance, emergency response, and leadership all working together in real time. That is the difference between installed safety and operational safety.

A secure school opening is not proven because hardware was installed. It is proven through use, inspection, maintenance, training, compliance, documentation, and emergency performance.

The national conversation should not be reduced to one product, one device, or one mandate. It should be about making sure hardware, people, procedures, communication, maintenance, prevention, and governance work together before the emergency happens.

As we improve locked-door security, we should also keep asking the next question: Where does the risk shift next?

That means corridors, cafeterias, gyms, restrooms, common areas, exterior spaces, arrival/dismissal, athletics, playgrounds, and student movement areas must remain central to our planning, training, supervision, communications, and options-based response.

The report supports locked doors but it also reminds us not to stop there.

Related Member Discussions

Recent NCSSD discussions have explored topics including door breach testing, access-control challenges, and questions around whether school safety systems perform as intended when it matters most.

Explore ongoing discussions, peer insights, and membership opportunities at NCSSD.org.

This article was contributed by Guy Grace, K-12 National Security Program Manager at ASSA ABLOY. Grace has worked in the security field for 37 years, serving over three decades as the Director of Security and Emergency planning for Littleton (Colo.) Public Schools before retiring in September 2020.

Grace is also NCSSD's Government Relations Committee Chair and Vice Chair of PASS K12.